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Abstract 
 
     In the 60 years since the Second World War ended scholars, policy makers, and 
international development institutions have paid increasing attention to the complex 
relationship between institutions and economic performance in developing countries. As 
noted North (1990: 61), it takes resources to transform inputs of land, labor, and capital into 
the output of goods and services and that transformation is a function not only of the 
technology employed, but of institutions as well. In this respect, together with the 
technology employed, institutions affect the performance of agricultural activities by their 
effect on the transaction and transformation (production) costs that make up total costs. 
Therefore, in order to understand the causes of agricultural underperformance in developing 
countries, it is necessary to reexamine the role of institutions in agricultural development, 
their links, constraints and the effect of their changes. The present study attempts to 
examine the impact of selected formal and informal institutions on resource utilization, with 
special reference to land utilization and water resource management, in the rural agricultural 
sector in Sri Lanka. 
 
I. Introduction 
     In the years since World War II, with the institutionalist movement continuing to be an 
important part of the development of economic thought, many researchers have emphasized 
that institutions play a significant role in agricultural development. For example, Ruttan 
(1975: 94) has clearly stated that: 
             
“In the past, technical constraints on agricultural production have generally 
represented a more serious barrier to agricultural and rural development in 
poor countries than have institutional constraints. As some of the technical 
constraints have been removed, institutional constraints have emerged as 
increasingly significant barriers to the realization of higher levels of 
productivity in rural areas.” 
 
Together with the technology employed, institutions affect the performance of agricultural 
activities by their effect on the transaction and transformation (production) costs that make 
up total costs. The costliness of information is the key to the costs of transacting, which 
consist of the costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the 
costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements (North, 1990: 27). As 
neoclassical economists assumed, if information is perfect so that transaction through the 
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market are costless and agency contracts between farmers and government agencies are 
faithfully enforced, the appropriate mix of market and state provide an adequate basis for 
the developing agricultural sector to alleviate rural poverty (Hayami & Godo, 2005:310). In 
developing countries, however, information is imperfect, and the degree of imperfection is 
comparatively larger in the rural agricultural sector, resulting in high transaction costs. 
According to theoretical arguments, institutions together with the technology employed 
determine those transaction costs. Moreover, it takes resources to transform inputs of land, 
labor, and capital into the output of goods and services and that transformation is a function 
not only of the technology employed, but of institutions as well. Therefore, it is assumed 
that total agricultural production not only depends on economic factors like capital, land, 
labor, and water but also the quality of both formal and informal institutions. 
     The term “institutions” means different things to different people. In a narrow 
interpretation, institutions can be thought of as the formal rules of the game that shape 
individual incentives and constraints. In a broader interpretation, institutions also include 
unwritten informal codes of conduct and constraints such as norms of behavior and 
conventions of a society. In this respect, institutions are generally classified into two major 
groups: formal and informal institutions. However, for this study institutions will be defined 
as “a set of formal and informal rules of conduct that facilitate coordination or govern 
relationships between individuals or groups”. By adopting this definition, this study identifies 
formal institutions as the rules that are designed externally and imposed on society by an 
external authority (state) and informal institutions as the rules that evolve within a society 
mainly based on the needs of the society.   
     The performance of the agricultural sector in Sri Lanka in recent years has been quite 
unsatisfactory with the deceleration in the growth rate of agricultural output. Even though 
the non-agricultural sector in Sri Lanka has been recording an impressive performance, 
particularly since the end of internal war in May, 2009, there are apprehensions that a high 
growth rate in the non-agriculture sector alone would not help Sri Lanka to realize a high 
overall growth rate if agriculture continues to remain in a low growth trap. Despite 
substantial decline in the share of the agricultural sector in the economy’s total output, the 
country has not witnessed similar decline in the share of population working in agriculture or 
dependent on agriculture for livelihood. During the sixty years since independence2, the 
share of agriculture in the total workforce of the country has merely declined from 53 
percent in 1950 to 33 percent in 2009. The most severe issue is that this 33 percent of 
labour force engaged in  the agricultural sector  contributed only 12 percent to GDP (Central 
Bank, 2010). This large and persistent gap between agriculture’s share of GDP and 
employment suggests the poor of the country are largely concentrated in the rural 
agricultural sector. 
     The causes of this agricultural underperformance are complex and varied. The costs of 
production have been increasing while the levels of agricultural productivity  lag behind the 
potential levels. High production costs and low productivity levels, in turn, have been caused 
by inadequate or/and inefficient formal institutions such as inappropriate policies, weak 
government administration etc. For example, a case study which was done in India by 
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Chopra and Duraiapph (2009; 268) found that badly designed land tenure reforms 
(inappropriate policies) caused many individuals or families to adopt unsustainable farming 
activities that inadvertently caused a further drop in their land productivity. The drop in land 
productivity in turn forced many of the poor farmers to lose access to the economic facilities 
they needed to improve their land quality and adopt sustainable management practices. 
Moreover, economists as well as other social scientists have realized that the behavior and 
transformation of formal institutions is also a function of informal institutional factors. For 
example, Southworth and Johnston (1967) notice that neither the technology nor the 
economics of industrial societies can be simply transferred to developing countries whose 
traditional cultures have been little touched by the ideas of modern sciences or of modern 
large scale economic organizations. Therefore, in order to overcome the obstacles facing 
rural farmers in developing countries, it is necessary to reexamine the role of institutions in 
agricultural development, their links, constraints and the effect of their changes. 
     In this respect, this paper mainly aims to examine the impact of selected formal and 
informal institutions on resource utilization, with special reference to land utilization and 
water resource management, in rural agricultural sector in Sri Lanka. First it attempts to 
explore the theories and empirical evidence concretely on the relations between institutions, 
transaction costs and resource utilization in the agricultural sector. Then the study focuses 
on some selected formal (agricultural development policies and government administration) 
and informal (community leadership, mutual trust, and farmers’ attitudes) institutions, and 
their impact on the transaction costs of the resource utilization, mainly the land utilization 
and water resource management, in the study area. 
 
II. Institutions, Transaction Cost, and Resource Utilization: An Overview of 
Theories and  Evidence 
     Increasingly, economists as well as other social scientists have realized that economic 
theories cannot explain people’s real world without paying considerable attention to the role 
of institutions under the situation of positive transaction costs. Thus, Institutional 
Economists have created a new approach to fill the gap between reality and conventional 
economics while explaining that any kind of human society depends on two sets of 
institutions, i.e. formal and informal. It is true that institutions were never totally excluded 
from consideration by classical or neoclassical economists. For example, institutions played a 
role in the work of “orthodox” theorists such as Adam Smith, J.S. Mill, and Alfred Marshall, 
though not a central one. However, in New Institutional Economic (NIE) literature 3 , 
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approach associated with the names of Velben and Commons and the new approach developed by 
institutional economists such as Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson and Douglass North. Redek & Susjan 
(2005: 996) have found two major differences in these two approaches: the old institutional 
economics rejects the hypothesis of a rational economic player in favor of one that places economic 
behavior in its cultural context (see Neale 1987 and Hodgson 2000). For new institutionalists mankind 
is still a rational chooser, but more focus is given to the role of institutions. Economists have taken 
these two different approaches to understanding institutions as they attempt to understand which 
institutions are relevant for growth and development. 
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institutions are defined in a broader sense, linking various different measures of institutional 
quality to development outcomes from various angles and disciplines. 
     Veblen (1898: 376), the first social scientist who attempted to develop a theory of 
economic and institutional evolution stresses that “economics is a process and institutions do 
shape this process”. It means institutions affect the behavior of economic agents and thus 
affect economic performance. Nabli and Nugent (1989, 1335) explain three types of 
characteristics which can be considered basic to the concept of an institution. The first 
characteristic is that it is important to consider configurations of rules rather than single 
rules separately. The second characteristic of institutions is their ability to govern the 
relations among individuals and groups. The third characteristic is their predictability. 
Pointing out the above characteristics, Nabli and Nugent define institutions as a set of 
constraints which governs the behavioral relations among individuals or groups. In this 
respect, agricultural development policies are institutions because they provide sets of rules 
and regulations which govern the relationship among all the individuals and groups that are 
mainly engaged in agricultural activities. Likewise, agricultural administration, be they at 
national level, provincial level, district level or grass-roots level, are institutions because they 
embody rules and regulations which govern their operation. Similarly, community leadership 
evolved within the society, mutual trust both among the members of the community and 
between members and nonmembers, and various types of farmers’ attitudes which are 
governed by cultural rules and codes of conducts are institutions in so far as they, too, can 
constrain the relationships between different individuals and/or groups.  
     According to the institutional economics, real-world decision makers will always function 
inefficiently relative to the hypothetical decision makers of neoclassical theory. The 
argument of the major cause for this inefficiency is based on the idea that transactions are 
costly. Mainstream economic theory assumes that the direction of resources is dependent 
directly on the “price mechanism” and the normal economic system works itself being 
coordinated by the price mechanism. However, Coase (1937) in his “The Nature of the Firm” 
explained for the first time that there is a “cost of using the price mechanism” (that is, 
transaction costs) and the most obvious cost (transaction costs) is the cost of “organizing” 
production through the price mechanism. The ideas generated by Coase gave major impetus 
to the development of the concept of transaction costs in the field of the New Institutional 
Economics. However, with the development of the concept of transaction costs, many 
scholars tend to use this theory to explain a number of different human behaviors while 
explaining various types of transaction costs which can be obvious in day-to-day economic 
activities.  
     Many scholars and researchers have revealed that the category of transaction costs 
mainly includes those of information, bargaining and negotiation, monitoring/supervision, 
coordination, verification and certification, and the enforcing of contracts (Bardhan, 1989; 
Hobbs, 1997; Furubotn & Richter, 2000; Gabre-Madhin & Eleni, 2001; Badstue, 2004). 
However, institutional economics theory identifies the major cause for any type of the above 
transaction costs is  the weak institutional environment. For example, if there is no trust 
(informal institution) between farmers and traders/buyers, it may be a major obstacle, 
particularly for farmers to obtain the correct information. As a result, farmers have to use 
time and resources to secure correct information or otherwise, lack of information and 
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information asymmetry leads to inefficient resource allocation for agricultural activities. 
According to Chiles & McMackin (1986: 88), when there is a high level of trust between two 
parties, contract costs are lower because it is not necessary to include all kinds of costly 
safeguards. In the agricultural sector, if there is a trustworthy relationship between farmers 
and wage-laborers, it is no longer necessary to check every time whether they are really 
doing what they promised to do (reduce the monitoring transaction costs). At the same time, 
in the process of enforcing the contracts, government can facilitate farmers to reduce the 
enforcing transaction costs any stage of the agricultural value chain. For example, if 
government legally protects the tenant farmers through proper land reform policies (formal 
institution), it supports  reducing the enforcing of the transaction costs of the tenant farmers.    
     Moreover, an efficient community leadership, appointed by the government authority or 
by the community, can play a significant role in various ways in order to allocate the 
available scarce resources in an efficient way, while reducing the transaction costs of their 
community members through providing reliable information that may be related to input and 
output markers, government policies, or resource management decisions such as water 
resource management decisions, land utilization, and property rights. Furthermore, some 
scholars (Mojarradi, Zamani & Zarafshani, 2008; Lichtenberg & Zimmerman, 1999; Pratab & 
Ponnusami, 2006; Ngowi, 2003) found that there is a significant relationship between 
farmers’ attitudes and agricultural activities such as use of pesticides, livestock farming, 
sustainable agriculture, land-use policy changes, agriculture-related environmental pollution 
and crop insurance. The intensity of these attitudes would vary depending on their operating 
environment (Ganpat & Bholasingh, 1999: 33). In brief, the presence of a favorable 
institutional environment can reduce any kind of transaction costs in the agricultural value 
chain, and it would help to get the optimal use of resource allocation and hence high 
productivity.  
 
III. Methodology of the Study 
Conceptual Framework  
     This study has hypothesized that the agricultural development of the country can be 
achieved by focusing on the institutional outcome of the reduction of any kind of transaction 
costs that engage in the resource utilization of the agricultural value chain. Figure 1 
demonstrates the structure of the model. 
     According to Figure 1, the final outcome of the conceptual framework, i.e. agricultural 
development, is considered to be the result of the behavior of individuals within both the 
formal and informal institutional context. The formal institutions are mainly formed by the 
government to intervene in its agricultural development activities while facilitating its top-
down administrative activities. The informal institutions are identified as an intangible 
resource of the farmers’ community itself which has an influence, directly or indirectly, on 
farmers’ decisions of resource utilization. Although there are various formal and informal 
institutional factors which can influence the agricultural development in any country, this 
study mainly focuses on two main formal institutions, i.e. agricultural development policies 
and the administrative structure that is responsible for those policies implementation, and 
three main informal institutions: mutual trust, farmers’ attitudes and community leadership. 
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In order to understand the possible role of both formal and informal institutions in 
agricultural development in any country, it is important to examine how these institutions 
can reduce the higher transaction costs (institutional outcome) that engage in the process of 
farmer decision making on the utilization of their scarce resources. If the above formal and 
informal institutions support positively  reducing the higher transaction costs of resource 
utilization, the study assumes that it would help to get the optimum use of resources and 
hence high productivity. High productivity will increase farmers’ income in the short-term 
and if it continues without fail, it would be possible to develop the agricultural sector in the 
long-term. However, this study is limited to analyzing the impact of institutions on land 
utilization and water resource management, and it will not attempt to discuss the short-term 
or long-term benefits of institutional outcome in detail. Furthermore, the study will not 
attempt to measure transaction costs directly. 
 
        Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Data Collection: 
     The analysis of the hypothesis that was explained under the above conceptual 
framework is mainly based on the primary data collected from a field survey conducted in 
Sri Lanka during the period October to November 2011. For the field survey, three villages 
from different districts in Sri Lanka, namely Weewalawewa (Matale District), Welgala 
(Kurunegala District), and Maha Kekirawa (Anuradhapura District) were selected for the 
study area (see the appendix). In the survey, 1005 households were selected using random 
sampling for the interviews which represented the above three villages (Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
Formal 
Institutions 
Informal 
Institutions 
Reduce TC of Resource 
Utilization 
 Agricultural 
Development 
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       Table 1: Size of the Sample 
 
Name of the Village 
Actual 
Number of 
Households 
Coverage of 
Households 
in the 
Survey 
 
Percentage 
of 
Coverage  
1.Weewalawewa 
   (Matale District) 
 
2.Welgala 
   (Kurunegala District) 
 
3.Maha Kekirawa 
   (Anuradhapura District) 
 
495 
 
 
327 
 
 
534 
338 
 
 
264 
 
 
403 
68 
 
 
81 
 
 
75 
           Total 1356 1005 74 
                   Source: GS Reports in each Village and Sample Survey 
 
IV. Impact of Formal Institutions on the Transaction Cost of Resource 
Utilization: The Experience of the Study Area 
(a) Land Policy, Policy Implementation and Transaction Cost of Land 
Utilization 
     Since independence in 1948, particularly after 1971, successive governments in Sri Lanka 
made some changes for land alienation policies introduced by the British colonial period 
while adding new land reform laws and regulations. However, issuing grants4 for the lands 
alienated under the Land Development Ordinance (LDO) of 1935 commenced in 1982 under 
the Land Development Act (amendment) of 1981. Land grants were variously titled 
‘Swarnaboomi’ (1982-1994), ‘Jayaboomi’ (1995-2002), ‘Isuruboomi’ (2002-2004), and back 
to ‘Jayaboomi’ since 2005. It is important to note that though ‘Swarnaboomi’ grants were 
prepared with a survey map, ‘Jayaboomi’ grants were not. Moreover, land grant title was 
introduced in 1994 and was applied to both LDO based irrigated settlements as well as land 
alienated under the Land Reform Laws of 1972 and 1975. Furthermore, the Registration of 
Title Act No. 21 of 1998 was enacted with the objective of providing titles to land parcels. 
However, there have been numerous difficulties in implementing the legislation because of 
the absence of appropriate provisions towards conflict resolution during the process of land 
titling, denial of registration in case of co-ownership which is widely prevalent and culturally 
acceptable in the country, lack of clarity in handling subsequent transactions relating to 
lands for which titles are issued, absence of consensus on the issue of Second Class titles, 
etc. In addition, the Land Ownership Bill was suggested by the World Bank to give freehold 
titles to the allottees of the alienated state lands and this led to much controversy as some 
were of the view that it would create more negative impacts on the poor. 
     At present, however, roughly 1.4 million hectares of the 2.25 million hectares of 
agricultural land in the country are government owned, and out of those, approximately 1 
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division, inheritance restrictions, etc. 
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million hectares have been distributed over the last seventy years for private household use 
through a series of land distribution programs (World Bank, 2008). Moreover, successive 
post-colonial governments attempted to solve the problems related to land utilization, 
particularly among the Second and Third generation through implementing various rules and 
regulations. However, the implementation of land distribution programs as well as land 
utilization rules and regulations are hampered by the fact that the administration and 
management of land in Sri Lanka is handled by more than 39 operational laws and a number 
of government institutions. At the national level, three Ministries 5  and the Executive 
President have responsibilities regarding the subject of land and land development. The 
Ministry of Land and Land Development that has primary responsibility for land and land 
development, has three departments and two other divisions6 for the implementation of its 
policies. Moreover, nine Provincial Councils have posts of Provincial Land Commissioner for 
the implementation of Provincial Councils’ responsibilities regarding land and land 
development. On the other hand, the responsibilities regarding the subject of land are 
implemented through Divisional Secretaries, Colonial Officers, and Grama Niladaris (Village 
Officers) who are officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Therefore, while implementing 
government land policies, the Divisional Secretaries have power to intervene in the land 
matters such as holding the land Kachcheri7, selecting suitable allottes and granting the land 
permits, recommending land for alienation etc. At the village level, the Colony Officer and 
Grama Niladari (Village Officer) are entrusted with the functions regarding the State lands 
under the supervision of the Divisional Secretary. However, many people criticize the current 
land administration system while critical of the lack of coordination among those institutions 
leading to overlapping of authority and contradictory decisions and policies. In other words 
these settlements are not traditional villages, but bureaucratically controlled entities. They in 
turn are a part and parcel of the highly centralized state. In this way the creation of a new 
peasantry is managed through a high degree of central control. 
     As witnessed by the data in Table 2, about two-thirds of the respondents in 
Weewalawewa, one-fifth in Maha Kekirawa, and one-fourth in Welgala utilize lands without a 
proper property right. Although almost all of them have applied for land deeds, farmers 
claimed that they have to face a long delay to get a permanent land title. Moreover, it could 
be observed from the field survey that some farmers in the study area have applied more 
than two times for a permanent land deed. Although the regulations for administration of 
the lands exist on paper, in reality, the bureaucratic process in the formal institutions on the 
ground is convoluted and haphazardly enforced, often lacking in transparency, and not well 
understood by either administrators, or permit holders and grantees. Furthermore, since 
                                                             
5 Ministry of Land & Land Development, Ministry of Public Administration & Home Affairs, and Ministry 
of Defense, Public Security, Law & Order (Department of Government Printing, 2007; Damayanthi & 
Nanayakkara, 2008: 76-77). 
6 Department of Land Commissioner, Department of Land Settlement, Department of Survey General, 
Land Use Planning Division, and Institute of Surveying & Mapping (Department of Government 
Printing, 2007; Damayanthi & Nanayakkara, 2008: 76-77). 
7 ‘Land Kachchery ‘ means a meeting held in the prescribed manner for the purpose of alienating state 
land. 
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there are significant delays and transaction costs of approvals, people are forced to spend a 
lot of time dealing with particular officers and occasionally is subject to the pressure of 
bribes. Therefore, it is obvious that the inefficient function of the formal land institutions has 
increased the transaction costs of obtaining proper legal land rights. 
 
             Table 2: Distribution of Landed Property by the Availability of  
                            Property Rights in the Study Area 
 
Availability of Property 
Rights 
Percentage of Total Households 
Weewalawewa Welgala Maha Kekirawa 
 
With Deed 
Without Deed 
 
 
37.3 
62.7 
 
79.9 
20.1 
 
75.4 
26.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
              Source: A sample survey conducted by the Author in 2011 
    
     Absence of secured land rights undermines prospects for agricultural development, as it 
reduces incentives for investments in improving their farm lands. Moreover, most of the 
farmers in the study area explained that if there is a proper legal document to prove the 
land ownership, such a document can be used as a security when they borrow money from 
formal financial sources like banks. Otherwise, farmers may have to find guarantors to apply 
for bank loans. Finding guarantors is an additional transaction cost for poor farmers, 
particularly because of the high level of uncertainty about the repayment capacity of 
agricultural loans. Moreover, when the transaction cost of finding guarantors is high, farmers 
tend to fulfill the required financial capital by borrowing money from the informal sources 
with high interest rates. If they cannot access either formal or informal credit sources, they 
may attempt to utilize resources in accordance with their own money. Therefore, the 
absence of secured land rights can affect underutilization of available land resources.   
 
(b) Irrigation Policy, Policy Implementation and  Transaction Cost of Water 
Resource Utilization 
 
     According to the survey findings, the majority of the farmers in the study area applied 
mainly major and minor irrigation sources to fulfill their water requirement for cultivation 
practices in yala8 2011. Since Maha Kekirawa belongs to the Mahaweli-fed area, the majority 
of the farmers in this village use Mahaweli water for their cultivation practices. Moreover, it 
seems that the majority of the vegetable farmers in Weewalawewa and Welgala villages 
                                                             
8 In Sri Lanka, there are two major cultivation seasons associated with two monsoons and they are 
known as maha season and yala season. Maha season is the main season associated with North-east 
monsoons effective during September – April in the following year. Yala season is the secondary 
season which is associated with South-west monsoons effective during the period between May and 
September. 
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receive water from minor irrigations and agro wells. However, it is obvious from the data 
that the majority of the farmers in the study villages utilize irrigated water to cultivate either 
paddy or vegetables.   
     Traditionally, the farmers in Sri Lanka themselves have been fully responsible for water 
resource management and irrigation maintenance by applying conventional traditional rules 
and practices. The customary laws practiced in ancient times were revived by the British 
rulers and were given official recognition through the Irrigation Ordinance. However, since 
the expansion of irrigation facilities since political independence in 1948, government 
authorities, mainly the Department of Irrigation and Mahaweli Authority, became the 
responsible formal institutions for irrigation management and maintenance. Accordingly, 
major irrigation schemes in the study area are controlled by the above two institutions while 
minor schemes come under the Provincial Irrigation Departments (PIDs) and the Agrarian 
Development Centers. However, promoting farmer organizations, later governments 
introduced a new mechanism of maintenance incorporating traditional and modern forms of 
management practice.  
      
Table 3: The Function of Irrigation Institutions on Water Resource Utilization 
 
                           Function 
As a % of  Farmers who Utilized Irrigated 
Water 
Weewalawewa Welgala Maha 
Kekirawa 
(a)  Water Supply 
1. Did you consult any person/government  
      officer on  water availability? 
Yes 
No 
(b)  Water Disputes               
1. Do you have any problem regarding irrigated 
water? 
                                               Yes 
                                               No 
2. Have you consulted any person/government  
      officials ? 
                                               Yes 
                                               No 
3. Whom did you consult? 
           Agricultural Research & Production Assistant 
           Irrigation/Mahaweli Officer 
           Grama Niladari 
           Water Master (Jalapalaka) 
 
4. How is the progress? 
                                                 Good 
                                                  Bad 
 
 
 
59.3 
40.7 
 
 
 
59.9 
40.1 
 
 
41.6 
58.4 
 
45.0 
25.2 
9.8 
20.0 
 
 
41.0 
59.0 
 
 
 
76.6 
23.4 
 
 
 
40.6 
59.4 
 
 
32.0 
68.0 
 
57.8 
20.6 
7.0 
14.6 
 
 
12.1 
87.9 
 
 
 
86.1 
13.9 
 
 
 
47.3 
52.7 
 
 
51.1 
48.9 
 
30.7 
54.7 
4.0 
10.6 
 
 
34.0 
66.0 
Source: Same as Table 2.  
 
    However, the data in Table 3 reveals a large number of farmers in non-Mahaweli fed 
villages (about 41 per cent in Weewalawewa village and about 23 per cent in Welgala) do 
not consult any government officer regarding water supply and management. Since the 
water requirement vary according to the type of crop, particularly in yala season, the 
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information on the availability of water in those reservoirs and the dates of water issues is 
vital for farmers when selecting the seed variety to be cultivated during the season. 
However, most of the farmers claimed that irrigation/Mahaweli officials/Water Masters 
change the dates of water issues in the cultivation calendar without any prior notice. 
Therefore, some farmers who cultivate vegetables in their paddy fields pump water using 
their water pumps and then, in the same day or in the next day, they got to know that 
water is issued. Moreover, some farmers said that they do not know the exact dates of 
water issues and they often visit the field to observe whether water is issued or not. This 
type of uncertainty between farmers and irrigation officials leads to additional transaction 
costs for farmers. 
     Traditionally the farming community in Sri Lanka had its own means for conflict 
resolution traditional authority or a forum of veteran farmers such as the Gamsabhawa 
(village court) who were able to resolve conflicts within the community. Although the 
government has proposed in the Agrarian Development Act, No. 46 of 2000 to establish one 
Agrarian Tribunal per administrative district, it has not been implemented yet. Increased 
government intervention has also resulted in diminishing the accepted norms and traditional 
leadership roles that regulate use of community resources like irrigated water. Although the 
government has made efforts to resuscitate the traditional system by allowing farmers to 
elect their own farmer representative like Water Master/Jalapalaka and Canal Leaders, the 
survey found (Table 3) that the majority of the farmers in the study villages consulted 
regional level government officials like the irrigation officer, Mahaweli officer and Agricultural 
Research & Production Assistant (APRA). It means that the traditional leadership roles are 
now being increasingly taken over by the lower rungs of the state bureaucracy, thus 
incorporating the village with the outside. Today the villagers have to take their conflicts to 
persons (like APRA, Irrigation officer/Mahaweli officer, Grama Niladari) and institutions (to 
which those officials belong) outside the community, as the latter has become opened to the 
outside through a process of incorporation into the national system. As a result, criminal 
offences for example are dealt with by the police located in urban centers while agricultural 
or irrigation-related conflicts are taken to district or divisional-level officers. 
    Since there is no authority with legal power within their own community have to visit the 
outside government authorities to find solutions for the disputes over water utilization, and it 
will be an additional transaction cost for peasant farmers. Even though farmers visit several 
times those formal institutions, the majority of the farmers claimed that officials do not take 
actions to solve the problem at the initial stage while letting the problem becomes more 
complicated. According to the survey findings (Table 3), more than 60 per cent of the 
farmers who had consulted the officials and visited their institutions said that they cannot be 
satisfied with the progress of those institutions.  It seems that most of those officials are 
inefficient mainly due to the lack of their knowledge about the real problem in the field.  
Although a few officials visit the field once or twice, farmers said that such visits are not 
sufficient for them to understand the real problem. On the other hand, officials blame the 
farmers for not providing the correct information related to their water disputes. Moreover, it 
could be understood from the field survey that farmers who have a political relationship with 
regional level politicians influence government officials’ work. However, the actions of 
politically powerful farmers and the absence of a trustworthy relationship between farmers 
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and irrigation officials will further increase farmers’ transaction costs of obtaining irrigated 
water.    
 
V. Impact of Informal Institutions on the Transaction Cost of Resource 
Utilization: The Experience of the Study Area 
(a) Mutual Trust and the Transaction Cost of Tenant-Farming 
The pattern of paddy land utilization in the study villages is characterized by complex 
systems varying from single ownership to multiple ownerships. Apart from the owner-farm 
system, ande9 (share-cropping), badu (renting), and ukas10 (the land mortgage system), 
the common land tenancy systems, are widespread practices in this area. This tenure 
system remains around one-thirds in the Weewalawewa and Maha Kekirawa. However it  
remains at a slightly  low level in Welgala compared to the other two villages. Renting out 
land on ande, badda, or ukas often takes place due to financial difficulties within 
households or due to the non availability of family labor to work on the farm. In addition, 
some villagers who are engaged in non-farm work like government and private sector 
employees prefer to allow the land to be rented by farmers on an ande basis. 
 
Table 4: Mutual Trust and Tenurial Pattern of Land Utilization  
 
 
Percentage of Total No. of Households 
Weewalawewa Welgala Maha 
Kekirawa 
Tenurial Pattern 
Own Land 
Taken on Ande/Badda/Ukas 
Given on Ande/Badda/Ukas 
 
69.5 
23.1 
7.4 
 
87.8 
8.4 
3.8 
 
68.7 
24.1 
7.2 
Any written agreement with land lender/borrower 
             Yes 
             No 
 
20.6 
79.4 
 
16.1 
83.9 
 
8.1 
91.9 
Any problem with land lender/borrower 
            Yes 
             No 
 
12.7 
87.3 
 
22.6 
77.6 
 
10.6 
89.4 
Source: Same as Table 2. 
    Under any of the above tenancy systems, the availability of land for farming and security 
of tenure are mainly dependent on the trustworthy relationship between landlord and 
tenant. In selecting a tenant, the landlord usually gives priority to his blood relatives as well 
                                                             
9 Ownership is recognized as ande when the operator cultivates a holding owned by another party 
subject to the conditions agreed upon mutually between the operator and the land owner. At present, 
the owner has a right to obtain 1/4 of the harvest, and the tenant has to bear all the expenses of 
cultivation.  
10 Ukas is the Sri Lankan term for mortgage. Under this system, the person to whom property is 
mortgaged can enjoy the benefit of the land until the mortgagor releases his land. 
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as to close friends who assist in his agricultural and non-agricultural activities. For example, 
when the land is rented out to other farmers on an ande basis, Land owners are not ready 
to lend their lands to any one without mutual understanding of the tenant, because they are 
always very keen on the possibility of collecting the owner’s share from the tenant. In 
principle, the tenant’s rights mainly depend on the nature of the trustworthy relationship 
between him and the land owner. As shown in Table 4, most tenant-farming agreements in 
the village community are basically based on word of mouth rather than on written 
documents. Even though they do not keep a written agreement, the data reveal that the 
majority of the farmers in the study area have not faced any problems with their land 
partner. Therefore, the success of this system highly depends on the mutual trust between 
the land owner and the tenant, and such practices are important in reducing the transaction 
costs of both parties engaged in tenant-farming. However, it is also important to note that 
formal institutions related to the present land-tenure system do not function sufficiently to 
protect the landlord-tenant relationship. It means that the present system helps the landlord 
rather than tenant farmer. This is mainly because tenants are not much interested in 
following the government Land Act introduced in 1958 to protect tenant’s rights. This means 
that the landlord can change land share as well as land tenure according to his own benefit. 
This negatively affects the certainty of the tenants’ future.   
     Moreover, according to the land rules and regulations, the land allotters, particularly in 
Mahaweli area in Maha Kekirawa villages, cannot partition their irrigated paddy fields. They 
can nominate only one heir to whom the ownership of the irrigated land can be transferred. 
Therefore, legally partitioned land lots cannot be seen in the area but the lots are 
“informally fragmented” for cultivation. Therefore, trust between the inheritor and the other 
children of the 2nd and 3rd generation is very important since they have to cultivate the 
shared land without legal right.   
 
(b) Mutual Trust, Community Leadership, and Farmers’ Attitude towards 
Water Resource Management 
 
     Saving of water and its efficient use has been an important objective of irrigation water 
management in Sri Lanka. Although water is fundamentally a scare resource particularly in 
yala season in Sri Lanka, its supply can be, in effect, expanded if it is used more efficiently 
with less loss of water into drainage canals. In this respect, the powerful Farmer 
Organization (FO) can reduce losses as well as various types of transaction costs engaged in 
water resource management activities through cooperative actions among their members in 
order to get more water to their field. It could be observed from the field survey that water 
management activities function in Maha Kekirawa village which belongs to the Mahaweli H–
fed area better than in the other two non-Mahaweli villages. Even though there had been 
two farmer organizations in Maha Kekirawa village until the end of the 1990s, one farmer 
organization for each distributor canal was established by the MASL mainly in order to 
implement the Bulk Water Allocation (BWA) system. Under the BWA system, the quantity of 
water to be issued for a particular distributor canal and consequently for a particular user for 
the cultivation practices in a given season is fixed before commencement of the season. 
Water measuring devices have been fixed at key points in the canals and Water Masters 
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have been appointed for each Distributary Canal Farmer Organization (DCFO). Therefore, 
once the water is released to the sub-canals, the farmer organizations including the Water 
Master, the Canal Leader and all the water users in each canal have the responsibility to 
allocate the available water. The available supply was rotated in turn among all eligible 
water users, rather than being distributed simultaneously to everyone in small amounts. 
With a single, faster-flowing stream of water going to each field in turn, there was much less 
loss of water than if many smaller, slower flows were diffused through the command area. 
The BWA system has also freed up farmers’ time because otherwise they had to remain 
almost continuously in their fields, spreading their meager supply of water and guarding it 
against theft by others. Before then, during the intermittent and irregular periods of water 
distribution, they had to spend nights in their fields to ensure that they received the 
fractional share that they were entitled to (or to appropriate water from others less vigilant 
than themselves). Therefore, one of the benefits that farmers in the Maha Kekirawa village 
first reported from being cooperative in a farmers’ network that was established under the 
BWA system was that they can spend their nights at home. In brief, farmer organizations in 
each distributor canal are seen as making water users’ participation in water management 
activities more effective than if farmers were to attempt such activities on an individual basis. 
     
Table 5: Farmers’ Attitude towards Water Resource Management 
         
 
                        Type of Attitude 
Percentage of  Farmers who Utilized 
Irrigated Water 
Weewala 
wewa 
Welgala Maha 
Kekirawa 
 
(a) Farmers’ views on the establishment of FOs for water 
management 
Success 
Not much success 
Not success at all 
No idea 
 
(b) Farmers’ knowledge on funding sources for free water 
Government 
People’s tax money 
Foreign Aid 
No Idea 
 
(c) Farmers’ attitude towards charges 
Water should be free of charge 
Reasonable charge is OK 
No idea 
 
(d) Who will be finally affected by the free irrigated water 
policy 
Government  
All people 
Farmers 
No idea 
 
 
 
 
53.8 
31.3 
10.8 
4.1 
 
 
48.8 
22.1 
1.2 
27.9 
 
 
64.2 
27.9 
6.9 
 
 
 
15.0 
30.4 
33.3 
21.3 
 
 
 
 
52.2 
39.9 
5.9 
2.0 
 
 
55.8 
39.9 
- 
4.3 
 
 
58.9 
31.2 
9.9 
 
 
 
25.3 
23.3 
35.6 
15.8 
 
 
 
69.1 
24.7 
4.3 
1.9 
 
 
49.1 
46.6 
1.6 
2.7 
 
 
69.7 
25.2 
5.1 
 
 
 
29.8 
30.8 
23.6 
15.8 
 
Source: Same as Table 2. 
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    However, it is also important to note that the success of farmers’ cooperation in water 
resource management is highly dependent on the characteristics of the Water Masters, 
Canal Leaders and the trustworthy relationship among the farmers and between local 
leaders and farmers. Although the MASL introduced the same water management strategy 
to all the distributary canals in Maha Kekirawa village, it could be observed from the survey 
that water management activities in some canals are still inefficient mainly due to the 
informal institutional barriers such as inefficiency of the community leaders, lack of trust 
among the farmers and between leaders and farmers, and farmers’ negative attitude 
towards cooperative behavior. Moreover, following the same concept introduced by MASL, 
Distributary Canal Farmer Organizations (DCFOs) have been established even in 
Weewalawewa and Welgala villages which belong to the non–Mahaweli area. However, none 
of the DCFOs in those villages was involved in bulk water allocation activities at the time of 
the field survey. It was revealed from the field survey that there is a canal leader for each 
distributary canal like in Maha Kekirawa village, but there is only one Water Master for the 
whole village to manage the delivery of water in the main canal. However, regarding  water 
resource management, it could be observed that the majority of the farmers in 
Weewalawewa and Welgala villages  still prefer to use the available scarce water on an 
individual basis rather than it being distributed under any kind of rotational system. It is 
important to note that participation by individuals in local networks makes it easier for any 
group to reach collective decisions and implement collective action. However, still, it is 
unable to get the maximum farmer participation and contribution for meetings and other 
related activities organized by their canal farmer organizations. The farmers’ judgment on 
the government policy of establishing FOs for water management remains that the function 
of the FOs is not as great a success as the government expected. The following three 
factors have been identified as major consequences of this problem: first, the present FOs 
have been created by the government authorities in order to implement government policies 
giving less attention to farmers’ voice and their traditional leadership; second, Absence of 
cohesion among the leaders/office bearers of the FOs; and third, Political influences. 
     It was also observed from the survey that the majority of the farmers think that irrigated 
water is a non-economic good and hence they may believe that it is not necessary to have a 
collective action to manage the available water resources. According to Table 5, though 40 
per cent of the farmers in Welgala and 47 per cent in Maha Kekirawa said that people’s tax 
money is used for the provision of irrigated water, the general view of nearly half of the 
farmers in the study area reveals that the government bears the costs of irrigated water. It 
is also important to note that about 28 per cent of the farmers in Weewalawewa have no 
idea about the funding source for the free supply of irrigated water. It means that the 
government authorities have not educated these farmers regarding the costs of irrigated 
water. Hence the majority of the farmers still believe that water must  remain as a non-
economic good and, therefore, their attitudes toward the irrigated water is that it should be 
free of charge. The main reason not only for the less attention of the farmers on water 
resource management but also their negative attitudes towards charging for irrigated water 
can be viewed as their poor knowledge about the ultimate results of such welfare policies. 
Moreover, the lack of trust among farmers, between farmers and leaders of the DCFOs, and 
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between farmers and grassroots level government officials also can be viewed as one of the 
main barriers for farmers’ collective action. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks  
     The most of the scholars who studied on agricultural sector in developing countries have 
embraced and discarded a number of different explanations for agricultural 
underdevelopment. Many of these studies emphasized similar causes for stagnation of the 
agricultural sector in these countries.  However, institutionalists generally conduct analysis 
quite different from those normally undertaken by mainstream economists while considering 
a much broader and deeper set of variables. The core idea of institutional economics is that 
institutions matter for economic performance. As emphasized North (1990: 61), it takes 
resources to transform inputs of land, labor, and capital into the output of goods and 
services and that transformation is a function not only of the technology employed, but of 
institutions as well. Therefore, in order to overcome the obstacles facing rural farmers in 
developing countries, it is necessary to reexamine the role of institutions in the agricultural 
development, their links, constraints and the effect of their changes.   
     The study has found that many farmers in the survey villages had to bear various types 
of transaction costs as an additional cost to the total production cost in the process of their 
resource utilization mainly due to the absence of favorable support from their formal and 
informal institutions.  For example, though government land policy, rules and regulations 
exist on paper, in reality, the bureaucratic process on the ground has a long delay while 
increasing the transaction costs of obtaining proper legal land rights. The absence of 
secured land rights has also added an additional transaction cost of finding guarantors when 
farmers borrow money from formal financial sources. Moreover, the success of the land 
tenure system is also highly dependent on the trustworthy relationship between land-owners 
and tenant farmers since most of them rely on verbal agreements. 
     Since independence with the expansion of irrigation facilities, the traditional community 
leadership roles that regulate use of community resources like irrigated water are now being 
increasingly taken over by the lower rungs of the state bureaucracy, thus incorporating the 
village with the outside. Such institutional changes have caused farmers to take their 
disputes over water utilization to persons and institutions outside the community and it will 
be an additional transaction cost for rural farmers. Moreover, it was identified from the 
survey that most farmers consider irrigated water as a free good, such a negative attitude 
towards irrigated water has led farmers to think that water resource management is not 
their responsibility. Even though the concept of bulk water allocation introduced by the 
formal institutional structure in Mahaweli area in Maha Kekirawa has favorably supported  
efficient water resource management, to some extent, with the cooperative behavior of the 
sub-canal farmers, the expected results have been limited by some informal institutional 
barriers like farmers’ negative attitude towards water resource management and the 
absence of a trustworthy relationship among the parties  involved in water resource 
management. It was also observed that though several attempts had been made in non-
Mahaweli villages to follow up the same bulk water allocation system or similar strategy, the 
system still does not work properly in those villages mainly due to not only the lack of 
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favorable support from their formal institutional structure but also the unfavorable support 
from their informal institutional factors.     
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Appendix: Map of the Study Area in Sri Lanka 
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